The original OECD Report focused on two issues. First, it identified "tax havens" as jurisdictions with (a) no or nominal income taxes, and (b) one or more of lack of effective exchange of information, lack of transparency, and lack of substantial activities by taxpayers. 6 Second, it identified preferential regimes as regimes offering (a) a no or low effective tax rate and (b) one or more of ring fencing, lack of transparency, and lack of effective exchange of information. 7 The OECD condemned both tax havens and preferential regimes as "harmful tax competition."
Following the Report the OECD began efforts to curtail preferential regimes in OECD Member Countries and to force tax havens to cooperate. In 2000, the OECD published a second report focused in particular on how bank secrecy laws in many tax havens impeded their cooperation with international tax information requests. The report stated that all OECD countries should "permit tax authorities to have access to bank information, directly or indirectly, for all tax purposes so that tax authorities can fully discharge their revenue raising responsibilities and engage in effective exchange of information." 
The Data
The theoretical and practical basis for the concerns voiced in the OECD Report is laid out in detail elsewhere, so I will only summarize it here. 21 In the last two decades, competition for inbound investment has led an increasing number of countries (103, as of 1998) to offer tax holidays specifically geared to foreign corporate investors.
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Given the relative ease with which an integrated multinational can shift production facilities in response to tax rates, such "production tax havens" enable multinationals to derive most of their income abroad free of host country taxation. overseas. Moreover, the fact that in non-OECD countries the effects of tax competition do show in the data and lead to a decline in corporate tax revenue suggests that there is something happening in the OECD countries that prevents such a decline from taking place. Similarly, it is striking that OECD countries succeed in taxing the rich through the income tax far more than developing countries.
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In my opinion, the OECD effort to curtail harmful tax competition has something to do with this achievement. As far as the corporate tax is concerned, the effort to cut back on preferential regimes in OECD member countries, plus an increased vigilance on transfer pricing and a concerted effort to lower the permanent establishment threshold, have all prevented a decline in corporate tax revenues that would otherwise have taken place. GDP, a level not seen since just after the 1986 tax reform act (which significantly broadened the corporate tax base). This shows that crackdowns like the OECD harmful tax competition initiative can have a real effect on the macro revenue data.
On the individual side, the recent stories from Liechtenstein and Switzerland show that despite the OECD Report there is still a lot of revenue lost to tax havens. 46 The
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation estimated the total number for just the US as $100 billion a year; other estimates are lower ($50 billion) but still quite high. 47 However, the question is not how many people cheat, but how many more would have cheated but for the pressure on the tax havens and the negative publicity generated by the OECD effort. In my opinion, if the OECD did not put pressure on the tax havens, many more citizens of OECD countries would have transferred their funds to tax havens than the admittedly large numbers that currently do so. To the extent that OECD countries succeed in taxing the rich more than developing countries, and all the evidence shows that they do, this is in large part because of efforts like the OECD Report. The major impediment to adopting and strengthening CFC rules has been the fear of harming "your" MNEs in the face of competition from other MNEs. 49 But if all OECD countries acted together, source-based taxation by developing countries could be saved with no harm to competitiveness. 50 In the individual arena the problem is similarly a matter of coordination. 51 However, if the political will existed, the tax haven problem could easily be resolved by the rich countries through their own action. The key observation here is that funds cannot remain in tax havens and be productive; they must be reinvested into the rich and stable economies in the world (which is why some laundered funds that need to remain in the havens earn a negative interest rate). If the rich countries could agree, they could eliminate the tax havens' harmful activities overnight by, for example, imposing a refundable withholding tax (at 35%) on payments to non-cooperating tax havens, or more broadly to all non-treaty countries, and insisting on effective exchange of information with treaty countries. The withholding tax would be refunded upon a showing that the income was reported to the residence country.
The Future
The financial services industry will no doubt lobby hard against such a step on the grounds that it will induce investors to shift funds to another OECD member country.
However, the EU and Japan have both committed themselves to tax their residents on foreign source interest income. The EU Savings Directive, in particular, requires all 51 Guttentag and Avi-Yonah, supra.
EU members to cooperate in exchange of information or impose a withholding tax on interest paid to EU residents. Both the EU and Japan would like to extend this treatment to income from the US. Thus, this would seem an appropriate moment to cooperate with other OECD member countries by imposing a withholding tax on payments to tax havens that cannot be induced to cooperate in exchange of information, without triggering a flow of capital out of the OECD. 108, 04/1992.
